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NOTES AND COMMENTS
encouraged.17 It is negligence to interfere with the driver in some situ-
ations, but in others, non-interference will bar the guest from recovery.
Any rigid rule to apply to all situations is undesirable. The probable
North Carolina rule is that when danger arising out of the operation of
a vehicle by another is manifest to a passenger or guest who has ade-
quate opportunity to control the situation by warning the driver, and
he sits without protest and permits himself to be driven to his injury,
his negligence will bar a recovery-such negligence is not the negligence
of the driver imputed to him as a passenger, but his own negligence in
joining with the driver and facing manifest danger.' 8 The courts should,
however, consider each situation upon its facts, and apply the usual
negligence rule of the conduct of the reasonable man under the circum-
stances. The adoption of a statute to cover this situation in inadvisable
because a statute cannot be phrased to cover all the variations that are
sure to arise. The rule that a guest must exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances should be applied in all cases, regardless of the guest's
position in the automobile or his familiarity with automobile travel.
Further, unless negligence or the lack of it is clear, the issue of negli-
gence should be submitted to the jury. Constant application of this rule




At common law a chattel mortgage was valid as between the parties
thereto without change of possession ;1 but, in order to be upheld against
the attack of interested third persons, a transfer of possession to the
mortgagee was essential.2  The early registration acts,3 designed pri-
17 Hedges v. Mitchell, 69 Colo. 285, 194 Pac. 620 (1920) ; Bradley v. Interurban
Ry., 191 Iowa 1351, 183 N. W. 493 (1921); Chambers v. Hawkins, 223 Ky. 211,
25 S. W. 2d 363 (1930) ; Young v. White Sulphur Ry., 96 W. Va. 534, 123 S. E.
433 (1924).
1 1 LAW OF AUTOMOBILES IN NORTH CAROLINA §35 (3rd Michie ed. 1947).
'Williams v. Jones, 95 N. C. 504 (1886); McCoy v. Lassiter, 95 N. C. 88(1886); Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283 (1853); Pike v. Armstead, 16 N. C.
110 (1827).
McCoy v. Lassiter, 95 N. C. 88 (1886); see Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684,
128 S. E. 155 (1925); 1 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTAGES AND CONDIOTIONL SALES §176(Rev. ed. 1933) ; cases cited 10 Am. Jur, CHATTEL MORTGAGES, §157.
'N. C. Act of 1715, c. 38 §11: ". . . , That every mortgage of . . .goods or
chattels, which shall be first registered in the register's office . . . where the
mortgager (sic) liveth, shall be taken, deemed, judged, allowed of and held to be
the first mortgage, and be good, firm, substantial and lawful; in all courts of Jus-
tice within this government; any former or other mortgage of the same ....
goods or chattels, not before registered, notwithstanding; unless such prior mort-
gage be registered within fifty days after the date." N. C. Act of 1820, c. 3 §1:
"That no mortgage, nor deed or conveyance in trust for any estate, whether real
or personal . .. , shall be good and available in law against creditors or pur-
chasers for a valuable consideration, unless the same shall have been proven and
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marily to eliminate the necessity of transfer, were often inadequate and
led to unfortunate results. In North Carolina under the act of 1715,
courts of equity upheld unregistered chattel mortgages against the claims
of creditors or purchasers of the mortgagor who had notice of the
existence of the mortgage,4 and this rule was extended to give protec-
tion against an incumbrance registered after the execution of such
mortgage when there had been actual notice, even though the prior mort-
gage had not been registered within the statutory time.5 In order to
avoid this result, the act of 1820 was passed, extending the time within
which a mortgage could be registered and yet retain its priority, and
declaring a mortgage not registered within such time null and void as
against purchasers and creditors of the mortgagor. The privilege thus
conferred upon the mortgagee was much abused in that he could inten-
tionally withhold his mortgage from record as long as possible in order
to allow the mortgagor greater freedom in dealing with his creditors.(
The Act of 1829,7 which, in effect, is substantially the same today, was
enacted to meet this situation. This statute has not affected the com-
mon law rule as to the validity of the mortgage between the parties,8
registered .... within six months after the execution of such mortgage or deed,
or conveyance in trust; but that all mortgages, deeds, and conveyances in trust,
not so proven and registered within the time aforesaid, shall be held as against
such creditors or purchasers, as utterly null and void."
' Pike v. Armstead, 16 N. C. 110 (1827) ; see Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684,
128 S. E. 155 (1925); Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C. 358 (1874); Fleming v.
Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
'Pike v. Armstead, 16 N. C. 110 (1827). This rule was equitable in its opera-
tion, if, as appears to have been the case, it applied only when there was actual
notice of the existence of the unrecorded mortgage prior to the credit extension.
In such case, there could have been no possibility of prejudice through action in
reliance on the unincumbered state of the title. There were, however, other con-
siderations which the equity doctrine failed to take into account, namely, the legis-
lative policy of encouraging prompt registration, and the desirability of having the
public record full and conclusive.
'See, for example, Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283 (1853) ; Fleming v. Bur-
gin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
N. C. Act of 1829, c. 20 §1. In its present form this is N. C. GEN. STAT.
§47-20 (1943): "No deed of trust or mortgage for real or personal estate shall
be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or purchasers for a valu-
able consideration from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor, but from the registra-
tion of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county where the land lies; or in
the case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides; or
in case the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides out of the state, then in the
county where the said personal estate, or some part of the same, is situated; . . ."
8 See discussion in Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283 (1853) ; 1 JONES, op. cit.
mspra, note 2, §237; cases cited 14 C. J. S., CHATrL MORTGAGES §134. Since an
unrecorded mortgage is binding on mortgagor, it follows that it is binding on all
claiming in mortgagor's right: Hinkle Crauge Co. v. Greene, 125 N. C. 489, 34
S. E. 554 (1899) ; Williams v. Jones, 95 N. C. 504 (1886) (wife's claim for year's
allowance or dower); McBrayer v. Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204 (1910);
ANNO., 91 A. L. R. 299 (1934) (heir or personal representative).
Although valid, an unrecorded mortgage does not create an equity in favor of
the mortgagee in the property which would be superior to the rights of creditors,
purchasers or subsequent mortgagees with notice thereof. Such an equity arises
only when the transaction need not be in writing and thus is without the purview
of the registration statute. Roberts v. Massey, 185 N. C. 164, 116 S. E. 407 (1923)
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but its uniform construction has been that mere notice of the unregis-
tered mortgage does not make it valid as against a purchaser for a valu-
able consideration.9 Furthermore, if the person taking the property
is placed by law in the position of a purchaser,10 he has been held to be
within the protected class who may take advantage of the failure to
record.
When the third person claiming against the rights of an unregistered
mortgage is of the description "creditor," more difficulty arises. In
the case of Finance Corp. v. Hodges," recently decided by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, a creditor procured a judgment against the
mortgagor nine months before a chattel mortgage was given to secure
part of the purchase price of an automobile. During the period of less
than a month when the mortgage was unrecorded, the judgment credi-
tor caused execution to issue and the sheriff levied upon the chattel.
Four days later an assignee of the mortgagee caused the mortgage to
be recorded and instituted suit to recover possession. Held: The judg-
ment creditor by his levy had obtained the prior lien. The decision
appears to be in accord with the settled rule in this state since the credi-
tor had armed himself with legal process which entitled him to an in-
terest in the property before the mortgage was registered. 12 A dictum
in the case indicated that only a creditor who has fastened a lien upon
the mortgaged property can claim protection against an unrecorded
mortgage. Since the statute does not declare an unrecorded mortgage
void, but only that it is invalid to pass any property interest but from
registration, this conclusion is logical. There appears to be, however,
no direct holding to the effect that it is absolutely necessary that a lien
(correction of omission in deed due to mutual mistake) ; Spence v. Pottery Co.,
185 N. C. 218, 117 S. E. 32 (1923) (parol trust) ; cf. Finance Corp. v. Hodges,
230 N. C. 580 582, 55 S. E. 2d 201, 203 (1949).
'E.g. Weil v. Herring, 207 N. C. 6, 195 S. E. 836 (1934); Carolina Discount
Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925) ; Cowan v. Dale,
189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925) ; Bank of Colerain v. Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87
S. E. 967 (1916) ; Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C. 358 (1875). But cf. Fleming
v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843) ; Note 24 N. C. L. Rxv. 63, 65-66 (1945). Same
rule applies when suit in equity. See Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283, 286 (1853).
A purchaser for value within purview of statute may be one who takes in pay-
ment of preexisting debt. Starr v. Wharton, 177 N. C. 323, 98 S. E. 818 (1919) ;
Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885) ; Potts v. Blackwell, 57 N. C. 58 (1858).
But cf. Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949), Headnote
4 of which states the contrary rule, but this related to dictum dealing with crea-
tion of an equity resting in parol. See examples note 8 supra.
1o For example, assignee for benefit of creditors, Starr v. Wharton, 177 N. C.
323, 98 S. E. 818 (1919), and cases cited therein; cf. Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C.
684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925). But see, JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 2, §244.
11230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949).
-
2 E.g. Salassa v. Mortgage Co., 196 N. C. 501, 146 S. E. 83 (1928) (attach-
ment lien prior to recordation) ; Jordan v. Wetmur, 202 N. C. 279, 162 S. E. 610
(1932) (subsequent mortgage recorded prior to conditional sale agreement);
Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1918) (receiver appointed
prior to recordation) ; accord Bostic v. Young, 116 N. C. 766, 21 S. E. 552 (1895).
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be acquired prior to registration. Dicta in other cases may be urged
in support of conflicting rules,13 but in view of the doctrine generally
accepted by other jurisdictions14 and the federal construction' 3 given
the statute, there is little doubt that the court would hold that a general
creditor does not come within the class protected. In applying this rule
there would be no distinction between a prior or existing creditor, and
a creditor subsequently extending credit. 16
The purpose to be served by a registration statute and the rights
and interests to be protected are properly considered in determining
whether a particular type of creditor ought to be protected. As has
been pointed out, the primary aim in the enactment of the present statute
was to provide a satisfactory method whereby the mortgagor, without
possible injury to innocent third parties, might retain possession of the
property.17 Another purpose was to encourage prompt registration by
making such registration conclusive notice, and to protect the rights of
a mortgagee who acted with diligence and good faith.' s This statute,
as it has been construed by the North Carolina Supreme Court, fails to
accomplish these purposes in two major aspects: (1) A general creditor,
who has extended credit to a mortgagor on the faith of lack of prior
existing rights against the mortgagor, may, without fault on his part,
find that he must suffer loss upon subsequent registration of a mortgage
executed prior to the credit extension; (2) A mortgagee, who with dili-
13 That all creditors without limitation are included see Ellington v. Raleigh
Building Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 789, 147 S. E. 30, 310 (1929); Sneeden v.
Nurnberger's Market, 192 N. C. 439, 441, 135 S. E. 328, 330 (1926); Harris v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 190 N. C. 480, 485, 130 S. E. 319, 322 (1925).
That only creditors acquiring liens while mortgage withheld from record are
included, see Observer Corp. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 43, 94 S. E. 526, 527 (1918) ;
Francis v. Herren, 101 N. C. 497, 507, 8 S. E. 353, 358 (1888) ; accord, William-
son v. Bitting, 159 N. C. 321, 74 S. E. 808 (1912).
'4 See note 33 hifra.
15 Creditors as used in the North Carolina statute means lien creditors only.
Southern Dairies v. Banks, 92 F. 2d 282 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 761
(1937) , Elk Creek Lumber Co. v. Hamby, 84 F. 2d 144 (4th Cir. 1936) ; In- re
Cunningham, 64 F. 2d 296 (4th Cir. 1933) ; National Bank of Goldsboro v. Hill,
226 Fed. 102 (D. C. N. C. 1915) ; see Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cog-
gin, 78 F. 2d 471, 475 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 621 (1935).
1' Under the present North Carolina construction the sole question appears to
be whether a creditor has acquired a lien prior to recordation, and no distinction
is made between a creditor who extended credit prior to the execution of the
mortgage and one who extended credit during the interval when the mortgage -was
unrecorded. That a prior creditor acquiring a lien while the mortgage was un-
recorded is included, see Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201
(1949) ; Fleming v. Graham, 110 N. C. 374, 14 S. E. 922 (1892) ; cf. Credit Co. v.
Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 53 S. E. 2d 520 (1949). Likewise, subsequent creditors
thus acquiring a lien are included. Salassa v. Mortgage Co., 196 N. C. 501, 146
S. E. 83 (1928) ; Jordan v. Wetmur, 202 N. C. 279, 162 S. E. 610 (1932).
1 Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925) ; McCoy v. Lassiter,
95 N. C. 88 (1886); see Credit Corp. v. Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 447, 53 S. E.
2d 520, 523 (1949).
"
8Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928) ; Smith
v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 67 S. E. 48 (1910) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
Compare Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 376, 377 (1949).
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gence seeks to record and preserve his lien, may find that a creditor with
knowledge of the reasonable delay in recordation has acquired a prior
l1ien.
An examination of the recording statutes of other jurisdictions re-
veals much diversity of phraseology. The types of statutes may be
generally classified as follows: (1) Those declaring the mortgage to be
a valid and prior lien from the date of recordation, 19 thus dealing only
with when the lien of a mortgage shall become effective. No mention
is made of the invalidity of the mortgage as to any specified group of
persons. (2) Those providing that no mortgage shall be valid against
the rights and interests of any third person, or persons other than the
mortgagor or his heirs, unless it is recorded.2 0 These statutes do not
specify the effect a later recordation will have on the rights of those
persons as to whom it was once void. (3) Those declaring an unre-
corded mortgage void, inoperative, or of no effect against specified types
of claimants, including creditors of the mortgagor, until recordation.2 1
The principal difference from the second group is the designation of
the class protected. Those jurisdictions whose statutes come within
the first class have primarily faced the problem of determining whether
there has been a sufficient compliance with the statute,2 2 and the ques-
tion of which creditors are protected has apparently not been raised.
Since these statutes do not provide that a mortgage is void as to named
third persons, but rather that a lien vests in the mortgagee upon recorda-
tion, the creditor who has not acquired a prior right in the property
would seem to be eliminated. On the other hand, the statutes of the
"I ARK. STAT. ANN. §16-201 (1947); DEL. REV. CODE §§3333, 3336 (1935);
GA. CODE ANN. §§67-108, 109, 2501 (1935) ; LA. GEN. STAT. §5022.4 (1949 Supp.);
MD. ANN. CODE, art. 21 §§45, 52, 54, 56 (1939); MONT. Rv. CODE ANN. §§8278,
8279 (1935) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§940.5, 13 (1948 Supp.).
20 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 32 §§1, 8 (1935) ; CONN. STAT. tit. 58 §7268 (1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95 §§1, 4 (1934); ME. REv. STAT. c. 164 §1 (1944); ANN.
LAWS MASS. c. 255 §1 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §3486 (1942); N. H. Rzv.
LAWS c. 262 §§17 et seq. (1942) ; R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 442 §10 (1938) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. §13-0-1 (1949 Supp.) ; VT. STAT. §§2713 et seq. (1947) ; Wis. STAT. §§241:08,
241:10 (1947), as amended, Wis. Laws 1949, c. 429.
21 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47 §§110, 123 (1940) ; ARIZ. CODE ANN. §62-523 (1939);
CALIF. CIVIL CODE §2957 (1945 Amdt.) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §698.01 (1944); IDAHO
CODE §45-1103 (1948); BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. §51-504 (1947 Supp.); IOWA
CODE ANN. tit. 24 §556.3 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §58-301 (1935); KY
REv. STAT. §382.270 (1948) ; MIca. STAT. ANN. §§26.926, 927, 929 (1949 Supp.);
MINN. STAT. §511.01 (Henderson 1945); Miss. CODE ANN. §§868, 869 (1942);
NED. REv. STAT. §36-301 (1943); NEV. ComP. LAWS §§987, 988 (Supp. 1931-
1941); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§46:28-5, 10 (1940); N. M k. STAT. ANN. §63-502(1941); N. Y. LIEN LAW §230 (1940); N. D. REv. CODE §35-0406 (1943) ; OHIO
GEw. CODE ANN. §§8560 et seq. (1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46 §§57, 58 (1936) ;
ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§68-203, 207 (1943 Supp.); S. C. CODE ANN. §8875(1942); S. D. CODE §§39.0408; 39.0411 (1939) ; TENN. CODa ANN. §7192 (Wil-
liams, 1934); TEXAS CrvIL STAT. ANN. art. 5490 (1949 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN.
§§5194; 5200 (1942); WASHr. REv. STAT. ANN. §3780 (1943 Supp.) ; W. VA. CODE
ANN. §3993 (1943); WYt. Comp. STAT. ANN. §§59-105, 113 (1945).
22 Gasconade Development Co. v. Trust Co., 195 Ark. 404, 112 S. W. 2d 653(1938).
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second class are as broad as possible in their terms, thus admitting of
almost any interpretation to effectuate their purposes. Generally, these
jurisdictions have given protection to the general creditor. 28 There
are, however, other states, 24 which have narrowly defined the class
protected, excluding general creditors whether prior or subsequent.
Those states having statutes of the third type make up by far the largest
group. Of these, Idaho and New Mexico have given an express legis-
lative mandate that only lien creditors are intended. 25 The legislatures
of Kentucky and Washington have specified otherwise, expressly pro-
viding that the term "creditors" shall include all creditors irrespective of
whether they have acquired a lien. 20 The South Carolina statute is
limited in its operation to those creditors extending credit while the
mortgage is withheld from record. 27 Aside from these exceptions, no
qualification or limitation is attached to designate those classes of credi-
tors intended, thus leaving the courts to their own determination.
In the construction of recordation statutes the courts have followed
various lines of reasoning. Several jurisdictions -  have treated the
situation as involving two separate consideration: the first, the legal
right of protection; the second, the procedure necessary before a credi-
tor with such legal right is in a position to derive benefit therefrom.
Following this approach, there is prima facie agreement that a general
creditor, whether prior or subsequent, is given the legal right of pro-
tection.29 This apparent uniformity ceases when it is sought to deter-
mine what the protected creditor must do to keep his protection. At
this point some jurisdictions make a distinction between prior and sub-
23 Basing their decisions on the policy of the statute and a comparison of the
broad phraseology of their statutes with those of other jurisdictions, Utah and
Missouri have reached the result that a mortgage is void as to those extending
credit while unrecorded and no lien is required before recordation. Volker Lumber
Co. v. Utah and Oregon Lumber Co., 45 Utah 603, 148 Pac. 365 (1915) ; Harrison
v. South Carthage Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 68, S. W. 963 (1902). Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, whose statutes provide that
mortgages must be recorded within a designated time have concluded that a mort-
gage not so recorded remains void as to interim creditors even though subsequently
recorded. Collateral Finance Co. v. Brand, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N. E. 2d 392
(1938) ; compare Drew v. Streeter, 137 Mass. 460 (1884) with Connecticut Val-
ley Onion Co., 281 Mass. 287, 183 N. E. 526 (1932) ; Bordick v. Coates, 22 R. I.
410. 48 Atl. 389 (1901).
" Bogdon v. Fort, 75 Colo. 231, 225 Pac. 247 (1924) ; Graham v. Perry, 200
Wis. 211, 228 N. W. 135 (1929).
" IDAHo CODE §45-1103 (1948) ; N. Max. STAT. ANN. §63-502 (1941).
"
0Ky. Ray. STAT. §382.270 (1948); WASH. REv. SrAT. ANN. §3780 (Supp.
1943).
" S. C. CoDE ANN. §8875 (1942).
"
8 E.g. Cameron v. Marvin, 26 Kans. 612 (1881) ; Harrison v. South Carthage
Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 68 S. W. 963 (1902) ; Il re Shay's Estate, 157 Misc.
615, 285 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1935) ; Union National Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54
N. W. 1034 (1892) ; Raney v. Riedy, 70 S. D. 174, 16 N. W. 2d 194 (1944) ;
Wasatch Live Stock Loan Co. v. Nielson, 90 Utah 307, 56 P. 2d 613 (1936) ; 10
Am. JuR., CHATm MORTGAGES, §103.
"9 Cases cited note 28 supra.
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sequent creditors, requiring the prior creditor to arm himself with a
lien prior to recordation, while allowing a subsequent creditor to retain
protection without a lien.30 In such a case, even though the subsequent
creditor can claim no interest in the chattel until he has acquired a lien,
this may be done at any time, and a later transfer of possession or
recordation of the mortgage is ineffective even though made before the
creditor obtains his lien. Other jurisdictions treat prior and subsequent
creditors alike. Several of these, while professing to give general
creditors protection, require the procurement of a lien before recorda-
tion in both instances. 31 Others hold the statute absolute in its terms,
and a mortgage not recorded as required is void as to all creditors.
Subsequent action by the mortgagee cannot give it validity.3 2
The great majority of courts33 have made no attempt to divide their
holdings into legal rights and procedure, but have flatly announced that
"creditors" as used in their statutes does not include "mere general
creditors." Thus, unless a creditor has perfected a lien prior to recorda-
tion, his rights and interests are subordinated to those of the mortgagee.
The reason generally assigned for this holding is that any debtor has a
right to prefer one creditor over another, and general creditors should
not be allowed to complain when priority is given a mortgage upon its
recordation, since they are then in the same position as if the mortgage
had been executed at the time of recordation. 34 Such reasoning is logi-
cally sound in so far as it applies to creditors who extended credit prior
to the original execution of the mortgage.35 When applied to a creditor
oRansom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. W. 128 (1935);
Harrison v. South Carthage Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 68 S. W. 963 (1902);
Wilkinson, Gaddis & Co. v. Bolen, 88 N. J. L. 680, 97 Atl. 279 (1916); Union
National Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892); Hollenbeck v.
Louden, 36 S. D. 320, 152 N. IV. 116 (1935).
21 Such jurisdictions claim allowance of protection since general creditors are
free to acquire a lien, a right they would not otherwise have. When the lien must
be acquired prior to recordation, the apparent leniency disappears, and the result
is the same as if the court had declared only lien creditors protected. See Cameron
v. Marvin, 26 Kans. 612 (1881). But cf. Campbell v. Killion, 124 Kans. 124, 257
Pac. 752 (1927).
" Chelhar v. Acme Garage, 18 Calif. App. 2d 755, 61 P. 2d 1232 (1936) (lien
acquired after possession taken by mortgagee) ; Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32
N. E. 1073 (1893) ; Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790 (1906) (lien
acquired after unreasonable delay in recording). See generally: Union National
Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892).
" Compare Moore v. Chilson, 26 Ariz. 244, 224 Pac. 818 (1924) with C. I. T.
Corp. v. Seaney, 53 Ariz. 72, 85, P. 2d 713 (1938) ; Bogdon v. Fort, 75 Colo. 231,
225 Pac. 247 (1924) ; McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939) ; lit re
Lewis' Estate, 230 Iowa 694, 298 N. W. 842 (1941) ; Munck v. Security Bank, 175
Minn. 47, 220 N. W. 400 (1928) ; Boody v. Star Furniture Co., 45 S. W. 2d 291
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; 1 JoNs, op. cit. supra note 2, §247b; 14 C. J. S., CHrrAEL
MORTGAGES, §137.
2 Cases cited 14 C. J. S., CHATTEL MORTGAGES, §137.
"n But prior creditors are entitled to some protection notwithstanding this rea-
soning. "The injury that an unfiled chattel mortgage may occasion an antecedent
creditor is likely to arise from the apparent unincumbered ownership of the prop-
erty in the possession of the debtor, justifying the inference of perfect security,
19501
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subsequently extending credit, the consideration is overlooked that he
may have acted on the assumption that there were no outstanding rights
against the property, and although the debtor may prefer in the future,
the creditor contemplates that risk.3 6
In recent years a growing minority of states have realized that those
constructions adopted by their courts are failing to carry out the policy
behind recordation. These states have modified their statutes in order
to compel a result giving adequate protection to subsequent creditors
even though they have acquired no property interest prior to recorda-
tion. 37 If the recordation statute of North Carolina were modified in
this aspect, its operation would be logically sound and in accord with
the purposes of such statutes.
The second failure of the North Carolina rule, although not as great
as the first, should be given consideration. If protection is to be ex-
tended to third persons when they adhere to the policy of the law, in all
fairness equal protection should be extended to innocent and diligent
mortgagees. In attempting to meet this situation a few jurisdictions
have given the mortgagee a limited time within which to record his
mortgage and preserve his lien against others intervening between the
making of the mortgage and its recordation.3 8 Although the early rule
in this state to this effect proved unjust in its operation,39 this was due
largely to the long period of time allowed within which to record. A
short, designated period of grace, consistent with the use of due dili-
gence, would accomplish the desired results.40
EMERY B. DENNY, JR.
and inducing delay in the enforcement of his claim. Were none but subsequent
creditors within the purview of the statute, the [prior] judgment creditor may also
be injured by the levying of an execution on property described in a secret mort-
gage, instead of the unincumbered property of the judgment debtor; .. ." Pierson
v. Hickey, 16 S. D. 46, 91 N. W. 339 (1902). But cf. Credit Corp. v. Walters,
230 N. C. 443, 447, 53 S. E. 2d 520, 523 (1949).
" Union National Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892).
" Conn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 274 §905h; Mass. Stat. 1874, c. 111 §1; Me. Laws
1919, c. 121 §1; R. I. Acts 1899, c. 614 §1 (a mortgage must be recorded within
a specified number of days, and recording thereafter void. If a creditor acquires a
lien before the mortgage recorded, it is prior even though mortgage subsequently
recorded within the time specified) ; Ill. Laws 1931 p. 669 §1 (mortgage not valid
as against creditors unless filed or recorded within 10 days. Construed to include
general creditors when compared with other provisions. Collateral Finance Co.
v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N. E. 2d 392 (1938), 27 ILL. BAR. Joum 345(1939)); Ky. Acts 1916, c. 41; Wash. Laws 1915, p. 277 §1 (express provision
inserted that creditors shall include all creditors irrespective of whether they have
acquired a lien).
"DEL. RZEv. CoDE §§3333, 3336 (1935) (10 days) ; Mz. RF,. STAT. c. 164 §1(1944) (20 days); WAsHr. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §3780 (Supp. 1943) (10 days).
"' See note 3 supra. Also discussion in Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283, 286(1853).
,0 Compare Note 26 N. C. L. R1v. 173, 178 (1948).
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